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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the trend in the United States’ criminal justice
system has been to punish children harshly and to subject them to the same
sentences that adult offenders face.1 By some estimates, over 200,000
* J.D. 2020, Seattle University School of Law. Thank you to all the passionate attorneys and legal
advocates throughout the world working to ensure the rights of youth. Additionally, thank you to
Professor Paul Holland for guiding me toward this topic and supporting me in my vision; to the
juvenile defense team of the Society of Counsel Representing Accused Persons, specifically Elinor
Cromwell, Jonathon Nomamiukor, Harold Palmer, Michael Morris, Scott Schmidt, and Katie Cline,
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youth are tried, sentenced, or incarcerated as adults every year.2 On any
given day, adult jails hold more than 4,200 juveniles, while adult prisons
hold 1,300.3 However, in response to a greater understanding of adolescent
brain development and maturity, courts have recently begun to
acknowledge the differences between youth and adults in terms of
culpability.4 For example, in a trilogy of cases—Roper v. Simmons,
Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama—the U.S. Supreme Court
found the differences in culpability were constitutionally significant for
the purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.5
In each of these three cases, the Court’s decision turned on attributes or
factors inherent in youth, finding those under eighteen less culpable for
their crimes under the Eighth Amendment.6 The factors the Court
considered included an offender’s (1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, (2) vulnerability to negative influences and limited
control over the offender’s environment, and (3) lack of characteristics that
can be rehabilitated.7 The Court reasoned that when considering such
factors, a crime committed as a juvenile cannot be said to be indicative of
a youth’s individual character or of his or her propensity to commit crimes
in the future.8 Accordingly, scholars argue, sentences that fail to reflect an
adolescent’s capacity for change should be unconstitutional or, at least,
should not be mandatorily imposed.9
In response to Roper, Graham, Miller, and recent developments in
adolescent brain science, many states have begun to reform their

for teaching me and inspiring me with your tireless dedication to the youth of King County; and to my
family and friends for always believing in me and fueling my dreams.
1. Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles Be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?,
A.B.A.: SECTION ON LITIG. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation
/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults/ [https://perma.cc/2
NNZ-NNE3].
2. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, KEY FACTS: YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3
(2018), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/factsheets/KeyYouthCrimeFactsFeb222018
Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6NN-FSHZ].
3. Id. at 5. Meanwhile, young offenders ages eighteen to twenty-one currently make up nearly
two percent of the federal inmate population nationwide. See Inmate Age, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS
(Sep. 29, 2018), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp [https://perma.cc/HB
F6-ZLWK].
4. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
5. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
6. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Sarah Sloan, Note, Why Parole Eligibility Isn’t Enough: What Roper, Graham, and
Miller Mean for Juvenile Offenders and Parole, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243, 244 (2015).
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sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders.10 Since 2007, only seven
states11 have failed to change their legislation to grant juvenile justice
eligibility to juveniles ages sixteen and seventeen who have previously
been automatically included in the criminal justice system as adults.12
States that have adopted Raise the Age (RTA)13 legislation have seen a
direct causal decrease in incarcerated youth and recidivism. 14 Despite
these efforts, none of the current sentencing schemes recognize young
adults in any sort of special category that allows for mitigation based on
their lack of maturity.15 The Court itself has previously recognized the
“shallow truth of age,” holding youth to be “more than a chronological
fact” and instead “a time and condition of life when a person may be more
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”16 Still, no state
currently authorizes juvenile jurisdiction17 past the age of eighteen.18
In a recent Washington Supreme Court opinion, State v. O’Dell, the
court officially recognized that a defendant’s youthfulness may support an
exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult
felony defendant.19 The state of Washington charged O’Dell with second
degree rape of a child.20 At sentencing, the defense asked the court to
impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range because “[t]he
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to
10. Hannah Benton, Recent U.S. Decisions Suggest that Justice System Should Not Treat
Children as Adults, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., https://youthlaw.org/publication/recent-us-scdecisions-suggest-that-justice-system-should-not-treat-children-as-adults/ [https://perma.cc/5EJYE5XB].
11. These states include Georgia, Missouri, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See JUST. POL’Y INST., RAISING THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND MORE EFFECTIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2017), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
raisetheagesummary_final_3_6_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZH7-3FW3].
12. TEMPLE U. CRIM. JUST. DEP’T, RAISE THE AGE: EXTENDING THE RESTORATIVE REACH OF
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2018), https://jjustice.org/wp-content/
uploads/JJIssueBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3ZG-S7SN].
13. Raise the Age reform focuses on moving youth under eighteen, who would automatically be
treated as adults because of age jurisdiction laws, out of the adult criminal justice system. JUST. POL’Y
INST., supra note 11, at 3.
14. TEMPLE U. CRIM. JUST. DEP’T, supra note 12, at 1.
15. See generally Kelsey B. Shust, Comment, Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving
Young Adults, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2014).
16. Id. at 669 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
17. Juvenile jurisdiction refers to the legal authority upon which the court can handle cases in
which juveniles are accused of acts that would be crimes if adults committed them. See Anne Teigen,
Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdictionand-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2FV-HWRA]. In forty-five states, the
maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction is seventeen. Id. All states have transfer laws that allow or
require young offenders to be prosecuted as adults for serious offenses, regardless of their age. Id.
18. TEMPLE U. CRIM. JUST. DEP’T, supra note 12, at 1.
19. State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 368 (Wash. 2015).
20. Id. at 360.
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conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly
impaired by youth.”21 His counsel also argued that “[h]ad the incident
happened two weeks prior[,] . . . [O’Dell] would be facing 15–36 weeks
in a well-guarded juvenile detention facility. . . rather than 78–102 months
in an adult prison.”22 Continuing its argument at the sentencing hearing,
the defense cited portions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper
v. Simmons, relying on various medical and psychiatric associations whose
research indicated that juveniles are more susceptible to negative
influences and impulsive behavior and therefore are less morally culpable
for their crimes relative to adults.23 The trial court acknowledged this
argument but ruled that it could not consider age as a mitigating
circumstance under the Washington State Court of Appeals decision in
State v. Ha’mim.24 The O’Dell Court of Appeals affirmed and the
Washington Supreme Court granted review. The Washington Supreme
Court held that the trial court erred in failing to consider youth as a possible
mitigating factor because O’Dell satisfied the two-part test the court
applies to determine whether a factor legally supports a departure from the
standard sentencing range.25
This Note argues that the O’Dell decision was a watershed moment
for criminal justice reform. It argues that the reasoning in O’Dell should
be seized upon by the legislature to take action to remediate instances in
which defendants are legal adults but do not possess the cognitive
characteristics of an adult sufficient to justify adult punishment. Given
both the scientific impossibility of identifying a precise age at which
characteristics of youthfulness end and adulthood begins and the Court’s
repeated recognition that these very factors impact culpability, the current
approach to sentencing young offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five as
adults simply because they are of the age of majority cannot stand. Instead,
this Note argues that Washington should add to its sentencing guideline
departure statute26 a direct subsection that would require Washington
courts to consider a defendant’s youthfulness at the time the offense was
committed, if the offender falls into the young adult offender category.

21. Id. at 361.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
24. Id. (citing State v. Ha’mim, 916 P.2d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)).
25. Id. at 363. To satisfy the two-part test, first, “a factor cannot support the imposition of an
exceptional sentence if the legislature necessarily considered that factor when it established the
standard sentencing range.” Id. Second, “in order to justify an exceptional sentence, a factor must be
‘sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same
category.’” Id. (quoting State v. Alexander, 888 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1995)); see also Ha’mim, 916 P.2d
971.
26. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2019).
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Part I of this Note provides background information regarding the
relationship between youthfulness and culpability and gives an overview
of the historical foundations of juvenile law and its development over time.
Part II describes the advancements in neurological and psychological
scientific research that courts have begun to use in evaluating the
youthfulness of an offender. Furthermore, Part II breaks down the
combined immaturities of the brain—distinguishing between behavioral
and structural immaturities—and examines how these immaturities
present themselves in a young offender. Part III then describes in detail
how the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized these advancements in
adolescent brain science in their holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller.
Additionally, Part III examines Washington State’s response to these cases
and highlights the importance of the findings from O’Dell for offenders
over the age of eighteen. Finally, Part IV argues that the courts should be
afforded the ability to depart from the sentencing guidelines for
psychologically and neurologically immature defendants even when those
defendants are older than eighteen years of age. Courts should be granted
this ability through passage of new laws to amend the sentencing
guidelines. Under such a scheme, it would be mandatorily presumed that
defendants who fall within this age category meet the court’s “youthful”
criterion and likewise have a right to a downward departure in the sentence
guideline calculation. Further, upon such a finding, a young offender
would be permitted to serve his or her time in the appropriate state juvenile
detention facility where the offender could participate in programs and
policies focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration.
I. CHANGES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE LAWS
Throughout the early 1900s, states began establishing juvenile courts
as an alternative means to criminal courts for the handling of cases of
young offenders.27 The juvenile courts were designed to be therapeutic in
nature, with the goal of intervening in the life of a troubled child and
shifting his or her criminal trajectory.28 Juvenile courts devised
individually tailored, remedial plans for young offenders based on that
child’s best interest and focused on rehabilitation.29
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, concerns about juvenile “superpredators who maim and murder without remorse or fear” became the
prevailing societal concern.30 As the media sensationalized violent crimes
27. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV L.
& SOC. CHANGE 101, 150 (2014).
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 152–154.
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committed by juveniles, the public began to demand that youth who
committed “adult crimes” do “adult time.”31 Legislators, as a result, found
it politically advantageous to start cracking down on youth crime, pushing
for harsher, more retributive punishments for adolescents.32
Many states enacted laws that made it easier, and more often
mandatory, to transfer juvenile offenders from juvenile or family court to
adult criminal court.33 Numerous states increased the types of crimes that
trigger transfer and most lowered the age at which it could occur.34 A
majority of states passed laws that created a presumption of transfer for
juveniles older than twelve or thirteen who committed a serious offense; a
third of states also enacted statutes authorizing prosecutorial waiver.35
Perhaps even more significant, thirteen states lowered the age at which
juvenile court jurisdiction ended to fifteen or sixteen.36 These increases in
“processing youth through the adult penal system” quickly proved to
“have serious consequences including increased physical and sexual
assault in prison against incarcerated youths, the solidification of a
criminal justice identity for youths, lack of access to age-appropriate
education, and steep financial costs.”37
Research in the 2000s reflected that juveniles housed in adult jails
and prisons were more likely to face physical and sexual victimization than
adult inmates.38 “Despite . . . encompassing less than one percent of jail
inmates,” studies from the 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics found that
youth made up twenty-one percent of “sexual assault victims for inmateon-inmate sexual assaults in jails.”39 “Sexually exploited youth,” as a
result, were often times “placed in solitary confinement, leading to
elevated rates of depression and suicide attempts.”40 Further, juveniles
held in adult jails or prisons faced suicide rates five times higher than those
held in juvenile facilities. 41 These traumas also exposed adolescents to

31. Id.
32. Id. at 155.
33. Id. at 156.
34. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Stephanie Tabashneck, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally Tailored Justice,
CRIM. JUST. MAG., Winter 2018, at 13, 15, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminal_justice_magazine/v32/TABASHNECK.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/R
9D8-V8NK].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
7 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf [https://perma.cc/L42K-3SGB].
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long-term effects, “including future adjustment difficulties and mental
health issues.”42
In addition to “threats to physical safety, . . . the processing of youth
through adult criminal justice systems . . . [proved to] promote an
entrenchment” into the criminal lifestyle for the youth that would
otherwise have been seemingly avoided. Essentially during a formative
period in life, an incarcerated “youth’s peer group becomes exclusively
comprised of other [youth and adults] who have broken the law.”43 This
“social environment[al]” change shifted “what the youth perceive[d] as
honorable, ethical, and moral,” and the “lack of exposure to law-abiding
peers result[ed] in significant repercussions.”44 Instead, youth who
otherwise “would have naturally desisted from criminal behavior
continued to maintain contact with the criminal justice system.”45 The
environment became “a place where the youth felt most accepted, worthy,
and at home,” and the result was more criminal behavior in the long run. 46
All of these consequences were a far cry from the “therapeutic” indicatives
of juvenile criminal justice reforms set out in the 1990s.47
Majority of youth also saw “a disruption of their educational
trajectory” as adult prisons do not have “developmentally appropriate
courses” available.48 The resulting lack of access “often compound[s]”
because “youth involved with the justice system . . . often already
perform[] below grade level” at the time of imprisonment. 49 These
“educational setbacks” result in “substantially diminish[ed]” future
opportunities for youth to gain lawful post-incarceration employment.50
Housing youths in adult criminal systems also proved to be
expensive. While these costs “vary from state to state, in all states, this
cost [was and continues to be,] a significant expenditure.”51 California, for
example, spent as much as $81,000 per inmate per year in 2019.52 Notably,
however, for youth facing less serious charges who remained in juvenile
court jurisdiction, diversion programs were far less costly and provided
youth with connections to much-needed resources,53 including mental
42. Tabashneck, supra note 37, at 15.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate?, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (2019),
https://lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_inmatecost [https://perma.cc/9QW3-DVUE].
53. Tabashneck, supra note 37, at 15.
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health treatment, educational support, health care, and job training.54 In
comparison to those youth facing detention and incarceration, youth in
diversion programs faced better outcomes with diminished recidivism
rates and higher rates of educational attainment and employment.55
For the last two decades, “juvenile crime rates have steadily
decreased, yet the harsh punishments of the 1990s [continue to] remain in
many state laws.”56 “With this shift, [the] key distinctive and rehabilitative
approaches [that once formed] . . . the juvenile justice system have been
lost to the more severe consequences” that come as a result of “criminal
justice system involvement.”57 Since 2010, however, “half of the states”
that once saw “all [sixteen] and [seventeen]-year-olds” excluded from
“juvenile court based solely on their age have [since] changed their
laws.”58 Now, unless a juvenile has been charged with or convicted of a
serious offense, it is presumed that most “who touch the justice system
will fall under juvenile court jurisdiction.”59 Of the seven states remaining
who have set the age of jurisdiction below age eighteen, a majority are
expected to consider raising the age proposals for certain groups of
teenagers.60 The basis for this “continuing change” reflects the “growing
acknowledgement that raising the age is good public policy.”61
With “increasingly more scientifically proven and cost-effective
ways to address delinquency,” today’s policymakers in the remaining
seven states can now change laws governing the age of jurisdiction with a
clear roadmap showing how they “can contain costs and enhance public
safety while absorbing sixteen and seventeen-year-olds into their youth
justice systems.”62 Those states that have already expanded their age
jurisdiction requirements have found an increase in community safety, a

54. Id.
55. Id. For example, after implementing a redirection program that diverts selected youth from
residential programs to less costly therapy based community programs, Florida has cumulatively saved
$211 million, averaging a savings of $31,000 per graduating youth. KRISTEN STALEY & MICHELLE
WEEMHOFF, MI. COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ., THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: MAKING THE CASE
FOR WISE INVESTMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 18 (2013), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/03cb01_314
cc9cf69154f0ab8bba66b9323d826.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8K-UMEA]. Additionally, participating
youth are 31% less likely to be arrested after completion and 35% less likely to enter adult prison than
non-participating youth. Id.
56. Youth in the Justice System: An Overview, JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/youth-justice-systemoverview [https://perma.cc/7NKV-9DL9].
57. Id.
58. JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 11, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6.
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decrease in long-term trauma and victimization, and a reduction in the
disproportionate impact of the justice system for young people of color.63
II. ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE & REDUCED CULPABILITY
In addition to an increased recognition of the above collateral
consequences and the shifting dynamics of age in the adult prison system,
developments in neuroscience have begun to impact the legal system’s
understanding of juvenile criminal behavior. Scientists are now able to use
“modern medical technology to explore the neurological bases for how
adolescents think and what differentiates them from adults.” 64 Through
these “psychological and neurological advances,” scientists have
“prove[n] that juveniles act impulsively, react rashly, and engage in risky
behavior[] without appreciation for the potential consequences due to
psychological and autonomically immaturity.”65
A. Behavioral Immaturity
Collectively, “adolescents have proven to be generally immature in
three separate, but related, ways: (1) adolescents are more likely to engage
in risky behavior than adults; (2) adolescents are less capable of
controlling their impulses than adults; and (3) adolescents are less capable
of regulating their emotional responses than adults.”66 Emerging research
explains why “adolescents tend to engage in far more risky behavior than
adults.” Previously believed to stem from “youthful ignorance,” it is more
likely that “risk-taking [behavior] comes from a psychological
misperception of potential rewards for risky behavior.”67 “Adolescents
have a less[er] ability . . . to regulate their emotional responses to stimuli,”
which can “result in actions being taken without full consideration or
appreciation” of the consequences.68 Adolescents are also more likely to
engage in risk-taking behavior when they are in the presence of peers.69
“This is associated with ‘greater neural activity in the areas of the brain
associated with reward processing’ because ‘adolescents appear to place
unique reward value on the presence of peers.’”70

63. Id. at 9–10.
64. Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role of Brain Science in
Protecting Adolescents, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 454 (2014).
65. Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89
WASH. L. REV. 963, 970 (2014).
66. Preston & Crowther, supra note 64.
67. Id. at 456.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Additionally, adolescents are limited in impulse control because
they lack the capacity for self-direction.71 “Without these controls
fully developed, adolescents lack a ‘cornerstone of cognitive
development.’”72 Regardless of whether “adolescents ha[ve] the cognitive
skills to . . . [weigh] the costs and benefits of their actions, their
impulsivity . . . [still has the power to] propel them into making unwise
decisions.”73
When it comes to “emotional regulation,” a variety of stressors can
affect an adolescent’s ability to effectively regulate their behavior, leading
them “to experience emotional states that are more extreme and more
variable than those experienced by adults.”74 These realities render youth
“more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,”
including their families and peers.75
B. Structural & Functional Immaturity
The physiological aspects of the adolescent brain are “fundamentally
different than they will be later on in adulthood.” One of the most
noteworthy structural differences lies in the development of the “prefrontal
cortex—the region of the brain that controls the ‘executive functions,’
including emotional regulation, impulse control, working memory, risk
assessment, and the ability to evaluate future consequences.”76 Upon
reaching its maturity, the “prefrontal cortex . . . [controls] impulsive
behavioral” reactions that would otherwise be controlled by “earlier
develop[ed] regions of the brain.”77 However, this maturation does not
occur until early adulthood, well into the mid-twenties.78 During formative
years, “decision-making and responses to stimuli are largely [controlled]
by the amygdala and other more primitive neurological regions.”79 “As the
brain [continues to] develop[] through adolescence and into . . . adulthood,
the communication between regions of the brain” begin to parallel in
improvement.80 These changes allow “complicated information to flow
more freely, and for areas of the brain associated with high-level reasoning
to . . . [take] control.”81
71. Id.
72. Id. at 457.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 463.
76. Straley, supra note 65.
77. Id. at 970.
78. Id. at 971.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Developmental studies also indicate that, “in addition to these
structural immaturities, . . . the adolescent brain functions differently than
. . . [that of] an adult.” Specifically, “adolescents and adults exhibit
different patterns of brain activity during decision-making tasks.”82 During
structural development, adolescent and “teenage brains . . . produce an
imbalance of dopamine and serotonin, the neurotransmitters that regulate
pleasure and the desire for rewards.”83 This unstable interplay “causes
correspondingly stronger desires for immediate pleasure and
gratification . . . while also rendering [adolescents] less able to resist those
heightened urges.”84 “These functional differences help explain why
‘adolescents experience . . . [increased] motivation for risky and rewardseeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the ability to selfregulate behavior.’”85
These “neurological immaturities” are observable in “psychological
studies and controlled observations of [adolescent] . . . behavior.”86
“Teenagers [habitually] score significantly lower than adults on
assessments” that measure impulse control and the ability to suppress
aggression.87 Additionally, “youth who have developed cognitive abilities
similar to adults [still] do not have the same ability to self-regulate their
behaviors, modulate their emotions, or [properly] weigh the consequences
of their actions.”88 The “combination of a [physically] developing brain
and the [neurological] . . . tendency toward risk, impulsivity, and limited
judgement often results in criminal conduct.”89
Statistically, it is typical for an adolescent “to engage in some form
of criminal behavior during . . . [adolescence].”90 Given these statistics,
traditional rationales supporting criminal sanctions—retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—apply with less force to
children and young offenders than to adults.91 Retribution is less
compelling based on a youth’s limited ability to control criminal behavior
and understand emotional impulses, rendering them less culpable than
adults.92 Similarly, deterrence is less likely to be effective with young
adults because “their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity . . . make

82. Preston & Crowther, supra note 64, at 460.
83. Straley, supra note 65, at 971.
84. Id. at 971–72.
85. Preston & Crowley, supra note 64, at 460.
86. Straley, supra note 65, at 972.
87. Id..
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
92. Id.
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them less likely to consider potential punishment.”93 Furthermore,
incapacitation does not justify applying adult penalties to youth, such as
life without parole, because “[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever
will be a danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he]
is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”94
And finally, long-term sentencing for youth reflects “‘an irrevocable
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,’ at odds with a
child’s capacity for change,” “forswear[ing] altogether the rehabilitative
ideal” of incarceration.95
III. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION
A. Roper v. Simmons
In 2005, psychological and neurological evidence-based studies on
youthfulness found their way into U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Roper v. Simmons, Christopher Simmons sought postconviction relief
after he was sentenced to capital punishment for murder.96 Simmons
argued that, despite the severity of his crime, the execution of an individual
who committed a crime when he was younger than eighteen years old is
prohibited under reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia.97 The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed and held that precedent, specifically Thompson v.
Oklahoma,98 provided sufficient evidence that society views juveniles as
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”99
Specifically, the Court relied on three differences between juveniles
and adults in making their decision: lack of maturity, vulnerability to
negative influences and outside pressures, and failure to have well-formed
characters.100 These findings, according to the Court, reflected what
psychological and neurological studies confirmed—that young offenders
were held to be less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes,

93. Id.
94. Id. at 472–73.
95. Id. at 473 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010)).
96. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
97. Id. at 559. Simmons was seventeen at the time of the alleged offense. Id. at 551. Atkins v.
Virginia held that the execution of a mentally handicapped individual was cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). The
Court reasoned that mentally handicapped persons do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct because of their disabilities in the areas of
reasoning, control of impulses, and judgment. Id.
98. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of sixteen when their crimes were committed).
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
100. See id. at 569–70.
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less likely to be deterred by the prospect of death sentences, and less likely
to be irretrievably depraved.101
While the Roper court addressed the psychological and neurological
differences between juveniles under eighteen years old and those of adults,
it remained firm in its acknowledgement that there must be limitations to
its application. Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion that “[t]he
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18.”102 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to conclude that
the line for death penalty eligibility should rest squarely with the societal
distinction of adulthood.103 The Court reasoned that because eighteen
years is “where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood,”104 so too should it be used as the line where
“death eligibility ought to rest.”105 The Court thus rejected use of a caseby-case standard of review in favor of a bright-line rule protecting all
offenders below the age of eighteen years old from the death penalty,
regardless of culpability.106
B. Graham v. Florida
With Roper “having banned the use of the death penalty [as a
sentence] for juveniles,” life without parole remained the “harshest
sentence available for offenses committed” by young offenders under
eighteen years post-Roper.107 In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered
a challenge to the mandatory life sentence of seventeen-year-old Terrance
Jamar Graham, who had committed a pair of nonhomicide felony
offenses.108 The Court held that Graham’s life without parole sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, recognizing that “nonhomicide
offenses d[id] not warrant the most serious punishment available” for
juveniles—a “concept of proportionality . . . central to the Eighth
Amendment.”109 In its opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, the Court cited
a number of concerns rooted in developmental neuroscience as the basis
for its decision: “(1) the offender’s limited culpability, (2) the particular
severity of life imprisonment without parole, and (3) the failure of
101. See id. at 570–71.
102. Id. at 574.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 554.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Feb. 25,
2020), https://perma.cc/R9D8-V8NK https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-lifewithout-parole/ [https://perma.cc/4JP6-UJG7].
108. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
109. Rovner, supra note 106.
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penological theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation to justify such punishment.”110
The Court relied on Roper’s reasoning that “juveniles are less
culpable and . . . less deserving of the most severe punishments because
they lack maturity, are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside
pressures” and have yet to fully form their characters.111 The Graham court
also noted that no recent data provided a basis to reexamine the
sociological and scientific findings used as a foundation for its decision in
Roper.112 Instead the Court clarified what it had left ambiguous in Roper:
that it “believed neuroscience [to be] relevant to general propositions as to
the normal developmental course of adolescence.”113
Regarding the severity of life sentencing, the Court acknowledged
the reality that young offenders generally serve more years and a greater
percentage of their lives behind bars than adults—”[a] 16-year-old and a
75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same
punishment in name only.”114 As a result, the Court acknowledged that
imposing such a punishment on younger offenders was especially harsh.115
Finally, in considering penological justifications, the Court found
that none of the goals of punishment provided an adequate justification for
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole.116
The Court ruled out retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation, finding that Graham’s sentence was by its nature
disproportionate and failed to pass the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishment test.117
C. Miller v. Alabama
Following the decisions of Roper and Graham, “approximately
2,500 offenders [remained] serving sentences of life without parole” for
homicide-related crimes committed as juveniles.118 In 2012, deciding
Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs jointly,119 the Court extended its
110. Shust, supra note 15, at 681.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 682.
113. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science after Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 765, 766 (2013), https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=ndlr
[https://perma.cc/4ZEU-ZCZ2].
114. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 71–73.
117. Id. at 74.
118. Rovner, supra note 106.
119. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (involving fourteen-year-old defendants who
were mandatorily sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for their involvement in
homicide offenses).
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reliance on the developmental differences between youth and adults,
holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory sentencing
schemes that do not allow judges or juries to consider the mitigating
characteristics of youth.”120 The Court used Roper and Graham as a
foundation for its decision, citing that they established a jurisdictional
precedent that “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing.”121
Once again, the Court relied on the developmental distinctions of
youth that render them less culpable and impair the traditional penological
justifications for punishment.122 This time, however, the Court combined
Roper and Graham’s focus (prohibiting severe punishments based on
reduced culpability)123 with another jurisdictional precedent that requires
sentencing authorities to consider a defendant’s specific characteristics
when determining punishment.124 In her opinion, “Justice Kagan
emphasized that judges must be able to consider the characteristics of
juvenile defendants in order to issue a fair and individualized sentence.”125
The Court noted that “adolescence is marked by ‘transient rashness,
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences’—all factors that
cannot be considered as crime-specific and should be considered when
“mitigat[ing] the punishment received by juvenile defendants.”126
Despite the Court stressing the importance of youthfulness in
sentencing determinations, Miller firmly limited its application to only
those under the age of eighteen.127 Rather than expanding on the Miller
Court’s reasoning for individualized sentencing considerations, lower
courts tend to follow suit, unwilling to blur the distinction between
juvenile and adult offenders.128 In a recent Washington Supreme Court
case, however, the Court recognized that the rationale behind Roper,
Graham, and Miller could be extended to defendants in their late twenties
at the time of their crime.129

120. Shust, supra note 15, at 683-84.
121. Miller, 567 U.S.at 471.
122. Id.
123. As discussed, the focus of the Court’s reasoning in Roper and Graham was on prohibiting
severe punishments based on reduced culpability. Id.
124. Id. at 470, 483.
125. Rovner, supra note 106.
126. Id.
127. Shust, supra note 15, at 684.
128. Id.
129. See State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 360 (2015).
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D. State of Washington v. O’Dell
In 2015, the Washington Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in
which it first recognized the research on adolescent brain science that had
been relied on by the United States Supreme Court over the last decade.
Sean O’Dell130 was convicted of second-degree rape of a child for having
sexual intercourse with a twelve-year-old girl ten days after his eighteenth
birthday.131 The court sentenced him to a “standard range sentence for the
offense—ninety-five months—in spite of his lawyer’s plea that he
receive . . . a sentence below the standard range.”132
The Washington Sentencing Reform Act statute “allows judges to
sentence [defendants] below the presumptive standard sentencing range if
the offense is atypical from other offenses resulting in the same conviction,
such that there are ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ justifying an
exceptional sentence.”133 The “statute contains a nonexclusive list of
circumstances which could justify an exceptional sentence below the
standard range, including that the ‘defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law, was significantly impaired.’”134 “O’Dell argued
that his youth[fulness]” fell into this category, which “prevented him from
appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct.”135 The trial court rejected
his argument and the Washington State Court of Appeals upheld the
ruling.136 The Washington Supreme Court revisited the issue and reversed
the Court of Appeals as to O’Dell’s sentence.137
The court focused its analysis on determining whether a trial court
may consider a defendant’s youthfulness as a possible mitigating factor
at sentencing.138 To determine whether such a factor legally supported
a departure from the standard sentencing range, the court applied a
two-part test:139
First, a factor cannot support the imposition of an exceptional
sentence if the legislature necessarily considered that factor when it
established the standard sentence range. Second, in order to justify an
130. O’Dell had turned eighteen ten days prior to when he allegedly committed the offense. Id.
131. Id.
132. David Hammerstad, State v. O’Dell: Youth and Culpability, THE L. OFFS. OF DAVID
HAMMERSTAD: BLOG (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.hammerstadlaw.com/state-v-odell-youth-andculpability/ [https://perma.cc/G6XW-MN9V].
133. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2019).
134. Hammerstad, supra note 133; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(1)(e) (2019).
135. Hammerstad, supra note 133; see also O’Dell, 358 P.3d at 360.
136. O’Dell, 358 P.3d. at 362.
137. Id. at 368.
138. Id. at 362.
139. Id. at 363; see also State v. Ha’mim, 916 P.2d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
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exceptional sentence, a factor must be ‘sufficiently substantial and
compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the
same category.’140

Applying the first prong of the test, the State contended that the
legislature “explicitly considered . . . age” when it made the Sentencing
Reform Act (SRA) applicable to felony offenders eighteen and older.141
The court disagreed, finding that this argument failed for two reasons.142
First, the court found that it had previously held that “when the legislature
defines . . . an offense according to the victim’s age, [that alone
has] . . . not necessarily prevent[ed] a sentencing court from relying on the
victim’s particular age to impose an exceptional sentence.”143 Second, the
court reasoned that,
when the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.030(34)—defining an
‘offender’ subject to the SRA as ‘a person who has committed a
felony established by state law and is eighteen years of age or
older . . . ’—it did not have the benefit of the data underlying the
decisions in Roper [v. Simmons], Graham v. Florida, and Miller v.
Alabama, since the SRA’s definition of an ‘offender’ predates Roper
by roughly 25 years.144

Therefore, “when the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.030(34), it did
not have the benefit of psychological and neurological studies showing
that the ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’ continue to
develop well into a person’s [twenties].”145 The court concluded that it was
precisely those differences that could justify a trial court’s finding that the
legislature failed to “necessarily consider[] the relationship between age
and culpability when it made the SRA applicable to all defendants” over
the age of eighteen.146
Applying its initial reasoning to this case, the court reasoned that,
while the “legislature has determined that all defendants [eighteen] and
over are, in general, equally culpable for equivalent crimes, . . . it could
not have considered the particular vulnerabilities—for example,
impulsivity, poor judgment, and susceptibility to outside influences—of
specific individuals.”147 In its application of the second prong of the test,
the court held that the past precedent, which denied the application of
140. O’Dell, 358 P.3d at 363 (quoting State v. Ha’mim, 940 P.2d 633, 636 (Wash. 1997))
(internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 364.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (internal citations omitted).
145. Id. at 365 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 364.
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youthfulness as a non-statutory mitigating factor under the SRA, did not
have the benefit of the studies underlying Miller, Roper, and Graham—
studies that establish a clear connection between youth and decreased
moral culpability.148 Now having the benefit of those advancements in
scientific literature and with the knowledge that age may well mitigate a
defendant’s culpability, even if that defendant is over the age of eighteen,
the court held that a trial court must be allowed to consider youth as a
mitigating factor when imposing a sentence on an offender like O’Dell.149
IV. INEVITABLE CHANGES AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Following Roper, courts at both the federal and state levels, including
Washington, have begun to consider the implications of the
acknowledgment that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults
do not disappear when an individual turns 18”150 and that the
developmental and neurological science factors found applicable to
children also apply to young adults.151 On the state level, some courts have
begun to permit a limited consideration of youth through their state
statutory guidelines.152 These statutes recognize the general idea that agebased mitigation may continue past eighteen, but in application, reveal that
youth-based mitigation is rarely used when sentencing young adult
defendants.153
The Eighth Amendment “must be interpreted according to its text,
by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for
its purpose and function in the constitutional design.”154 To implement this
framework, courts must refer to “the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society[.]” 155 Global trends and the
advancements in adolescent brain science demand changes be made to
existing sentencing schemes, specifically for age and evidence of
youthfulness to inform all sentencing determinations.
A. Age-Based Sentencing Statutes and Proposed Applications of
Mitigation to Young Adults
Most directly related to the Roper line of cases, litigation has begun
to question the bright-line rule distinction drawn when an offender hits the
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
151. Id.
152. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass
Incarceration, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 669, 695 (2018).
153. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 152, at 695.
154. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
155. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)).
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age of eighteen—a move that is both timely and necessary to advance
juvenile justice reform. State courts have seen an increase in expert
testimony, remarking on the development of brain science as it relates to
the youthful offender and arguing that, knowing what we know today, the
holding in Roper should be applied to similar cases for individuals
eighteen, nineteen, and even twenty years old.156
Broader trends seek to expand youthful offender statutes to include
more young adults. As seen in O’Dell, youthful offender statutes mitigate
sentences for certain crimes up to the age of twenty-five and provide a
range of rehabilitative services.157 These statutes recognize the general
idea that young adults should be treated differently than older adults. In
recent years, two states—Colorado and Vermont—have expanded their
youthful offender statutes to make them presumptively applicable to some
young adults.158
Several scholars have similarly proposed mechanisms for changes in
sentencing that would reflect the consideration of young adult offenders
as a special category. Barry Feld’s159 proposal, coined the “youth
discount,” could significantly reduce sentencing lengths for young adults
by giving fractional reductions.160 Recognizing the lesser culpability of
developing young adults, Feld’s proposal would create a sliding scale of
punishment by using age as a fraction basis of reduction.161 A young
offender could receive no more than a fraction of an adult sentence, with
the size of the fraction gradually increasing until the offender reaches a
certain cutoff age.162
Other reformers propose a more case-by-case approach. Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg163 suggest a set of reforms to create a
156. See, e.g., Tim Requarth, Neuroscience Is Changing the Debate over What Role Age Should
Play in the Courts, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/29/youngbrains-neuroscience-juvenile-inmates-criminal-justice-449000.html [https://perma.cc/KL3V-XLFJ].
157. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 152, at 683.
158. Colorado expanded its youthful offender statute to include eighteen and nineteen-year-olds.
2009 Colo. Legis. Serv. 278–79 (West). Vermont’s legislature expanded youthful offender status to
include individuals under twenty-two-years-old at the time of the offense. 2016 Vt. Acts & Resolves.
No. 153 §§ 1–2.
159. Barry Feld, Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, is an expert in
juvenile law, police interrogation practices, and procedural rights. Barry C. Feld, Curriculum Vitae
(2020), https://www.law.umn.edu/sites/law.umn.edu/files/feld-cv.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK83STYP]. Feld served as a visiting scholar at the National Center for Juvenile Justice and has authored
several chapters, articles for scholarly journals, and books including Cases and Materials on Juvenile
Justice Administration, Juvenile Justice Administration in a Nutshell, and Justice for Children: The
Right to Counsel and Juvenile Courts. Id.
160. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 152, at 690.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Elizabeth S. Scott is the Harold R. Medina Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Curriculum
at Columbia Law School. Elizabeth Scott, Curriculum Vitae (2019), https://www.law.columbia.edu/s
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developmental approach to young adult offenders.164 This approach would
expand youthful offender acts and build young-adult-specific prison
facilities.165 Regarding the length of time young adults spend in prison,
Scott and Steinberg propose a case-by-case approach.166 First, they argue
that young adults’ relative youth should be considered at sentencing and
then, once sentenced, that young adult offenders should be able to seek
parole earlier than older adults.167
While these proposals seek to reform the existing sentencing
schemes and take into consideration age-based mitigating information,
their controversy centers on whether we should treat young adults
differently than adults. The focus should instead be the degree to which
we treat young adults like children.
B. A More Robust Sentencing Scheme
While clear in certain respects, the opinion in O’Dell left ample room
for interpretation and expansion that arguably does not go far enough. In
its holding, citing the Roper line of case conclusions—that youth have
diminished capacity and that youthful features do not disappear at
eighteen—the court concluded that age could mitigate culpability and
justify a sentence below state guidelines on a case-by-case basis.168 This
begged the question of how frequently future courts would actually apply
an exceptional sentence for defendants other than O’Dell.
Just one year later, in State v. Alden, the Washington State Court of
Appeals refused to apply the ruling in O’Dell to mitigate the sentence of a
twenty-three-year-old who had “maturity and academic drive.”169
Similarly, in a recent 2019 case, the Court of Appeals rejected the
ites/default/files/faculty_profile/files/cv-elizabeth_scott-may_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SJVE3JM]. From 1995 to 2006, Scott was involved in empirical research on adolescents in the justice
system as a member of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development
and Juvenile Justice. Id. In 2008, she published Rethinking Juvenile Justice with developmental
psychologist Laurence Steinberg. Id. The book draws on their collaborative work to offer a framework
for juvenile justice policy and received the 2010 Society for Research in Adolescence Social Policy
Best Authored Book Award. Id. Laurence Steinberg is one of the leading experts on adolescence and
is a distinguished professor at Temple University. LAURENCE STEINBERG, https://www.laurence
steinberg.com/about [https://perma.cc/PX3Z-YAE3]. He has authored more than 450 articles and
essays on development during the teenage years and has been a featured guest on numerous television
programs. Id. Dr. Steinberg is a former President of the Division of Developmental Psychology of the
American Psychological Association and of the Society for Research on Adolescence. Id.
164. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 152, at 690.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 690–91.
168. State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 368 (Wash. 2015).
169. State v. Alden, No. 32695–1–III, 2016 WL 901027, at *14 n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8,
2016).
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defendant’s request to consider youth as a mitigating factor when his
crimes were committed when he was between fourteen and sixteen years
old.170 The court determined that the holding in O’Dell did not constitute
a significant change in the law and that it did not affect a sentencing
imposition that occurred when he was tried for the crimes as an adult.171
It thus appears unlikely that the case-by-case statutory scheme that
Washington currently has in place in regard to young adult offenders will
lead to palpable changes in young adult sentencing. A presumptive
sentencing scheme would much better serve criminal sentencing purposes.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Miller, developmental science
has proven that youthful attributions do not disappear the moment an
offender turns eighteen.172 If sentencing schemes took into account the full
timeline of human brain development, young adults would receive shorter
sentences that would ensure that the penological goals of the justice system
are still being met.
In her 2014 article titled Extending Sentencing Mitigation for
Deserving Young Adults, scholar Kelsey B. Shust argues for the imposition
of a nationwide rebuttable presumption when sentencing young adults.173
Shust maintains that a permissive scheme would allow for defendants up
to the age of twenty-five to seek mitigation.174 Under this design,
“[defendants] would have to reasonably show . . . that they (1) lacked
maturity and had underdeveloped responsibility, (2) were vulnerable to
negative influences and had limited control over their environment, and
(3) lacked characters that could be rehabilitated.”175 The prosecution
would then have the burden of showing “by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendants were sufficiently mature to be punished
according to the legislature’s design.”176
While such a case-by-case permissive presumption would certainly
alter sentencing for young offenders across the nation, in light of O’Dell,
this scheme is not enough for Washington. Instead, a mandatory,
rebuttable presumption would much better serve criminal sentencing
purposes. In adopting such a structure, a defendant’s youthfulness would
be an assumed mitigating factor. Like the younger defendants protected
by Roper, Graham, and Miller, a young adult would be presumed to lack
maturity, be vulnerable to negative influences, and lack developmental
170. In re Domingo-Cornelio, No. 50818-4-II, 2019 WL 1093435 (Wash Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2019)
(unpublished).
171. Id.
172. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
173. See Shust, supra note 15, at 699.
174. Id. at 698.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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characteristics. The burden would lie with the prosecution to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence,177 that the defendant was sufficiently
mature enough to be punished according to the adult sentencing scheme.
If the prosecutor can prove that, more likely than not, the young adult
offender did not possess the characteristics of youthfulness that
would warrant mitigation, adult sentencing guidelines would become
available for consideration. If, however, the prosecutor failed to present
such rebuttable evidence, the court would be required to apply an
exceptional sentence.
There are two reasons to prefer a mandatory rebuttable presumption
over the existing “case-by-case basis” sentencing scheme. First is the
inability to definitively identify what constitutes adult-like culpability
among young adult offenders. Culpability is not an objectively
quantifiable object that can be readily measured. Without an initial system
of uniformity, one less blameworthy young adult may have age considered
as a mitigating factor, while another who is an equally as blameworthy
young adult may not. A mandatory presumption reduces the potential for
bias and over-punishment for all less-culpable individuals.
Second, adopting a mandatory presumption would combat a judge or
jury’s inability to fairly weigh the mitigating factor of youthfulness against
a charged crime. As recognized by the Roper Court, the nature of a
particularly violent crime is likely to overpower any mitigating arguments
based on age even in cases where the offender’s youthfulness would
require a reduction in sentencing.178 A mandatory presumption would help
to combat the difficulty a judge or jury might have in distinguishing
between a person’s responsibility and their related culpability.
A mandatory, rebuttable presumption scheme would offer young
offenders the chance to receive categorical reductions from adult sentences
while supporting the judicial objective of reducing long term recidivism.
Shorter sentencing schemes would allow for young adult offenders to be
held accountable for their crimes while also promoting the opportunity for
rehabilitation and reintegration into society—the true aims of the criminal
justice system.
C. A Change in Correctional Facilities
Promising reforms have been implemented in the juvenile justice
system over the past generation which have provided policymakers with
177. A preponderance of the evidence standard, such as is suggested by Shust, would be an
appropriate burden for prosecutors to meet because it would balance the importance of preventing over
punishment for less culpable offenders while also keeping intact the fundamental judicial basis that
backs sentencing authorities.
178. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553–54 (2005).

2020]

Washington's Young Offenders

1353

guidance for focusing their work on young adult offenders. While no
current blueprint exists for the creation of a specialized facility aimed at
young adult offenders in Washington, effective juvenile justice programs,
policies, and practices are being tailored to include the unique needs
of this population.179 These programs include, for example, multi-systemic
therapy, which has been show to effectively reduce recidivism,
substance abuse and other mental health services, and social skills
training—all proven to be essential components of a successful
rehabilitative program.180
As the scientific evidence continues to advance in the realm of
neuroscience, research supports the creation of a system that recognizes
the diminished capacity of young adults while harnessing the opportunities
presented by their ability to grow, adapt, and change. As referenced in Part
II of this Note, today’s neurobiology suggests that young adults ages
eighteen to twenty-five are more developmentally akin to juveniles than
mature adults and are more apt to reform when presented with the
appropriate measures of support.181
As the need for distinction between adult and juvenile court remains
well-established due to the recognized developmental differences, it must
then follow that a substantially different response is necessary for young
adults in the justice system. Therefore, upon a judicial finding of
youthfulness, a young adult should serve their imposed exceptional
sentence in the appropriate state Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration
(JRA) facility. Time served in a JRA would provide these young offenders
with programs and facilities that would aid in promoting their integration
into the larger society as productive adults. With access to the appropriate
in-facility programming, such as education, job training, and mental and
physical health treatment, a reduction in recidivism rates would likely be
seen182—a statistic which, based on available data, puts young adults at a
staggering seventy-eight percent recidivism rate within three years.183
Additionally, if young adults were able to avoid exposure to the adult
prison system, they would not face the attributable collateral

179. See generally COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUST. CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND
IMPROVING OTHER OUTCOMES FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2015).
180. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 663 (2016).
181. See supra Part II.
182. See JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 11, at 22–24 (explaining how implemented raise the age
statutes have resulted in a decrease in recidivism rates).
183. VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED RESPONSES TO JUSTICE-INVOLVED
YOUNG ADULTS 6 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248900.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZW6AKAM].
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consequences, such as laws that limit their ability to get jobs, receive
student loans, and live in certain kinds of housing.184
While concerns exist regarding the incorporation of young adults in
the juvenile system,185 the proposed model would take into consideration
the mental and emotional age of each young adult and evaluate whether
the matter should be handled in juvenile or adult detention. Opposition for
“raising the age” often challenges the lenient nature of the juvenile system,
arguing that the addition of young adult offenders would negatively impact
public safety and readily destabilize an existing system.186 A mandatory
presumption would alleviate the preeminent concern over integration and
public safety by ensuring that only those with the applicable and necessary
characteristics are able to attain the greater benefit of juvenile status.
CONCLUSION
Roper, Graham, and Miller form a basis for the integration of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. O’Dell takes it one step
further for Washington by allowing youthfulness to be among the
considerations eligible as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Based on the
developments of adolescent brain science and its application to these
Eighth Amendment cases, scholars and courts alike have begun to address
age as a proxy for culpability. Culpability, however, is not quantitative and
cannot be measured to determine how much a young adult offender
possesses. A rebuttable mandatory, presumptive sentencing scheme would
combat the unknown nature of culpability, while supporting the current
trend of providing greater protections for our nation’s young adults.
Further, allowing young adults to serve their time in an approved state
juvenile facility would lead to palpable changes in recidivism and
adolescent growth because of its focus on rehabilitation, confidentiality,
and family engagement.

184. JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 11, at 11.
185. See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance
to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1494–99 (2008) (discussing arguments against raising the age of the
juvenile justice system); Scott et al., supra note 180, at 664–65 (discussing how scientific evidence is
not robust enough to support a response of leniency toward young adult offenders).
186. See Scott et al., supra note 180, at 665.

